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The Position of Palestinian Jerusalem Christians 
and Patriarchates on the status of Jerusalem 
– comparison and analysis of research findings1
Jerusalem, despite its unique multicultural heritage, continues to be deeply 
affected by political polarisation and ethnic antagonism. since 1967 so called 
Jerusalem question gradually evolved into one of the most complex problems 
of the modern Middle East. not only does it remain the core issue of the Israe-
li-Palestinian political impasse conflict but has also developed into an ethnic 
antagonism between Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants of the city.
As argued, persistence of Jerusalem polarization can be partly attributed to 
the ethnocratic nature of Israeli regime. In this sense the polarization is perceived 
as a direct consequence of ethnocratic pattern that structurally privileges one 
ethnic (Jewish) nation contributing to social inequality.2 noteworthy, since 
when ethnocracy has been the very part of the Israeli collective state identity 
it can be supposed that Jerusalem ethnic polarization will not be defused but 
will drift toward further intensification.
The conflict poses a particular threat to the existence of Palestinian Jerusalem 
Christians (hereafter: PJCh) as they constitute a small, hence vulnerable community.3 
The problem seems to be particularly relevant in the light of the high rate of emigration.4
1 The article is based on the researches financed by the Polish national science Centre, 
project number 2012/05/n/Hs5/02642.
2 o. Yiftachel, Understanding ‘Ethnocratic’ Regimes: the Politics of Seizing Contested 
Territories, “Political Geography” 2004 no. 23, p. 647–676. 
3 The number of PJCh is estimated to be 8000, see: A Diyar Consortium Survey on “The 
Christian Presence in the West Bank, And Christian Attitudes towards Church-Related Organi-
zations”, bethlehem 2008.
4 The problem has been illustrated by the latest research of b. sabella on emigration of PJCh. 
62% of the respondents of his research expressed a wish to emigrate. one third of respondents 
oriental ia  Chris t iana Cracoviensia  6  (2014) ,  s .  59–71
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Political polarisation in Jerusalem has become a serious challenge for 
advocacy as well as political and religious agendas of Jerusalem Patriarchates 
representing Christian communities.5 beginning from the early 90’s Jerusalem 
Patriarchs have not hesitated to issue significant, bold statements condemning 
Israeli policies. Particularly important, in this context, have been joint statements 
of patriarchs as they helped to unite and conceptualize Christian position toward 
Israeli presence in the city.
This background has provoked me to ask questions: what is so called common 
PJCh perception of the conflict, what their preferences are when it comes to 
the status of Jerusalem and, most importantly, whether their preferences are in 
accordance with the solution promoted by Jerusalem patriarchs. The purpose of 
this paper is to present results of the research which was undertaken to examine 
this problem. The research was conducted between May and July 2014 in Jeru-
salem and included the analysis of written sources issued by church institutions 
and Christian nGo’s based in Jerusalem; qualitative and quantitative methods 
represented by techniques of an in-depth interview and a survey correspondingly. 
In-depth interviews targeted local community leaders who were chosen through 
a targeted sampling. The survey targeted 200 respondents and was conducted 
by a team of native Jerusalem Christian interviewers and targeted respondents 
chosen thought snow-ball technique.6
The first part of the paper briefly deals with a political context of Israeli 
policies. The second section presents attitude toward the problem of Jerusalem 
status from the perspective of Jerusalem Patriarchates. The conclusive part 
of the paper presents the most important results of the research together with 
analysis of the findings.7
indicated that they know of an entire family of relatives, neighbors or friends who have emigrated 
during the last five years. Majority of the respondents indicated lack of employment opportunities, 
Israeli laws and measures that affect their lives and bad political situation as a main reasons for 
emigration. 81% of the respondents indicated Israeli occupation as a greatest challenge to PJCh. 
Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem, Results of a Survey – April 2014, in print.
5 Christians in Jerusalem belong to following communities: Latins (roman Catholics) 29%, 
Greek orthodox 27%, Greek Catholics (Melkites) 14%, Armenian orthodox 2%, Armenian 
Catholics 7%, syriac orthodox 8%, syriac Catholics 3%, Copts 4%, Protestants 4%, Maronites 
2% and others 1%. Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem, Results of a Survey – April 2014, in print.
6 The problem discussed in the paper are of many issues undertaken during the research. 
A full analysis of the research will be included in a paper that is being prepared as an outcome of 
Diyar Conference: shifting Identities: „Changes in the social, Political, and religious structures 
in the Arab world” that was held in Paphos, Cyprus (3–5 of July 2015).
7 The research itself had a broader scope. The problem presented in this paper is one of the 
many issues undertaken. As a consequence I am not presenting full analysis of the findings but 
considering only aspects related to the problem of patriarchates position on Jerusalem and its 
correspondence to preferences of the respondents targeted through the questionnaire. 
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Part I 
Legal and political status of PJCh does not differ from status of Muslim 
Palestinian Jerusalemites and as such have been defined on two levels. Above all 
Palestinian Jerusalemites (PJ) exist in a context of Israeli ethnocracy. secondly 
their status was determined by so called residency regime – a set of legal8 
measures applied in the wake of East Jerusalem (EJ) de facto annexation in June 
1967.9 Following the redrawing of the city borders, Israel conducted a census 
and granted permanent residency status to some of 66 000 of Palestinians who 
were present within the newly defined municipal borders. Palestinians of the 
‘territories’10 who remained outside these borders were excluded from the right 
to be physically present in the city without obtaining temporary entry permits.11 
The changes introduced by Israel have brought two significant consequences: 
isolation of East Jerusalem Palestinians from their compatriots from ‘territories’ 
and integration of East Jerusalem Palestinians into broader Israeli socio-political 
framework. It is worth emphasizing that both the isolation and the integration 
have been facilitated through a series of Israeli administrative measures applied 
with an aim to secure Israel’s de facto sovereignty over the city.12
Last but not least, social and cultural context of the existence of PJ has been 
affected by direct Israeli policies applied to maintain Jewish demographical 
dominance. of particular significance has been policies promoting Jewish 
demography through developing settlements projects.13
8 Accomplished through The Law and Administration ordinance (Amendment no.11 Law, 
5727 – 1967), and The Jerusalem Declaration, 1967. 
9 Israel never formally annexed EJ, but extended the city’s municipal boundaries and passed 
legislation authorizing the application of Israeli law. According to Israel the boundaries extension 
didn’t constitute annexation but municipal fusion. Extreme Makeover: Israel’s Politics of Land 
and Faith in East Jerusalem, Crisis Group Middle East report, 2012 no. 134, p. 4; G. Gorenberg, 
The Accidental Empire, new York 2006, p. 63.
10 The west bank and the Gaza strip.
11 More in: I. Lustick, Yerushalayim, al-Quds, and the Wizard of Oz: Facing the Problem 
of Jerusalem after Camp David, “The Journal of Israeli History” 23 (Autumn 2004) no. 2, 
p. 200–215. Legal status of East Jerusalem Population since 1967, ed. o. Halabi, Jerusalem 
2008, p. 11, Forbidden Families: Family Unification and Child Registration in East Jerusalem, 
b’Tselem and Hamoked, January 2004, www.hamoked.org.il/items/12600_eng.pdf. [16.09.2013].
12 De facto designate an action happening in practice and as such is used in contrast to de iure 
which refers to a legal situation. In the context of Jerusalem the de facto sovereignty status is 
related to the Israeli jurisdiction executed as a consequence of an armed conflict, hence, limited 
by the law of the belligerent occupation. The main limitation of the current de facto status is 
a prohibition of annexation, since occupation itself is limited by its temporary character. The 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary, ed. J. Pictet, ICrC: Geneve 1958, p. 275. 
Law of Belligerent Occupation, The Judge Advocate General’s school, Ann Arbor 1945, p. 23, 
C. Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace, new York 1916, p. 279. 
13 More on settlement policy in: By Hook and by Crook. Israeli Settlement Policy in the West 
Bank, b’Tselem, Jerusalem 2010; Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and 
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Part II 
The Israeli ethnic policy has been criticized by Patriarchates on numerous 
occasions. This criticism has been a direct response to measures aimed to 
manage demographic and cultural landscape of the city, be it israelisation or 
judaisation.14 of particular importance has been the criticism of the measures 
undermining Palestinian demography and posing a threat to integrity of the 
Palestinian family.15 Patriarchates’ standpoint on Israeli policies however 
included not only condemnation of particular measures but also alternatives to 
Israeli power monopolisation.
since the early 90’s Jerusalem patriarchates’ standpoint on Jerusalem status 
has gradually transformed toward Palestinian national agenda. of significant 
importance has been a departure from a traditional understanding of basic concepts 
of sovereignty, the concept of status quo and special status in particular. This 
tendency can be exemplified by joint patriarchal statements that were issued 
between 1990 and 2005.
status Quo concept (as referred to Jerusalem) can have at least two meanings: 
The status Quo of the Holly Places in the narrow sense – referring to a particular 
Building in East Jerusalem, b’Tselem, Jerusalem, January 1997; M. Dumper, The Politics of 
Jerusalem since 1967, Colombia University Press, 1997; Alison Hodgkins, Israel Settlement 
Policy in Jerusalem, Jerusalem 1998; Negotiation Deadlock. The Isolation of Jerusalem and its 
Ramifications, “rocznik ostrowieckiego Towarzystwa naukowego” 2014 no. 3–4; A. Mosely 
Lesch, Israeli Settlements In the Occupied Territories, 1967–1977, “Journal of Palestine studies” 
7 (1977) no. 1.
14 Israelisation is here understood as a policy aimed at partial assimilation of Palestinians into 
socio-political framework of Israel exercised through modernisation and isolation of PJ from 
Palestinians of the ‘territories’. This understanding has been presented inter alia by M. Amirav, 
see M. Amirav, Israel’s Policy in Jerusalem Since 1967, stanford Center on Conflict and negoti-
ation, stanford 1992. Judaisation is understood as a process of monopolizing cultural heritage of 
Jerusalem being undertaken to support an argument for Jewish sovereignty as well as strengthening 
Israel’s territorial and political control of Jerusalem being exercised by expansion of Jewish 
settlement and securing Jewish demographical dominance see: K. Maguire, The Israelisation 
of Jerusalem, “Arab Papers” 1981 no. 7; Extreme Makeover: Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith 
in East Jerusalem, Crisis Group Middle East report, 2012 no. 134; A. Latendresse, Jerusalem: 
Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967–94, PAssIA on-line publication, 
1995. The condemnation of judaisation has been expressed for the first in 1996. In the statement 
“Call for Peace and Justice in the Holy Land” 1996 (statement 1996) patriarchs stated: “we, 
therefore, call on the Israeli government to bring all its discriminatory policies to an end [...] If 
Israel maintains an exclusive sovereignty over the city, and continues its ‘Judaisation,’ Jerusalem 
will never be the city of peace”.
15 noteworthy, imposing of the restrictions on Palestinian Jerusalem families prompted 
Jerusalem Patriarchs to issue the first joint document regarding ethnic policies – Memorandum 
from the Heads of the Christian Communities in Jerusalem on the significance of Jerusalem for 
Christians, 14 november 1994 (Memorandum 1994). Israeli policies regarding the Palestinian 
families has been repeatedly condemned by the heads of Jerusalem patriarchates also in the 
subsequent years.
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sui generis legal regime established by promulgation through ottoman firmans 
and applied to manage disputes between different Christian denominations; 
a cultural status quo – concerning broadly defined relations between the rec-
ognized religious communities (Christians, Muslims, Jews).16 Traditionally the 
status Quo was understood in narrow, sui generis, sense.17 beginning from the 
90’s, however, the patriarchates have been gradually changing18 this approach 
toward broader, cultural dimension of the concept.
similar revision relates to the understanding of special status. In this regard 
the concept transformed from being perceived as a corpus separatum,19 to 
a legal measure securing both Churches’ privileges and Palestinian right to 
self-determination.20 special status is also understood as an instrument of 
prevention of power monopolisation and a mechanism of preservation of the 
city heritage21 as well as a notion endorsing internationalization of negotiations 
and an involvement of Jerusalem’s religious leaders.22
Patriarchal criticism on Israeli measures together with a change regarding 
understanding of Jerusalem status should be perceived as an important devel-
opments. In broader sense it might have helped to connect Patriarchates with 
the expectations of a lay community. on the other hand however, the joint 
statements did not express a stance regarding envisioned state belonging of 
the city. since the special status itself does not predestine regime affiliation it 
is justifiable to argue that any solution to Jerusalem is its internationalisation, 
a joint Israeli-Palestinian control or even re-division, that would plead freedom 
of worship and maintenance at least the narrow sense the status Quo can be in 
patriarchal optics regarded as satisfactory.23
16 E. Mollinaro, Negotiating Jerusalem. Preconditions for Drawing Scenarios Based on 
Territorial Compromises, Jerusalem 2002.
17 F. Elodie, The Vatican and Jerusalem, Jerusalem 2013, p. 7–14.
18 beginning from the Memorandum 1994.
19 An international regime that would protect heritage and the rights of the Churches. F. Elodie, 
The Vatican and Jerusalem, op. cit., p. 15–17. 
20 Transformation of the concept can be observed through gradual change developed through 
the following documents: statement by the Heads of Christian Churches and Communities 
in Jerusalem on the Jewish settlement Attempt in East Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 23 April 1990; 
statement by the Heads of the Churches in the Holy Land, Jerusalem, 14 January 1992 (statement 
1992), Memorandum 1994, statement 1996, Chancellor of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 
statement on the Church’s Position on the Final status of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, August 2000 
(Latin Chancellor’s statement 2000); Patriarchs and Heads of the Local Christian Churches in 
Jerusalem, statement on the status of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 29 september 2006 (statement on 
Jerusalem 2006).
21 As in statement 1996 and statement on Jerusalem 2006.
22 As in Letter from Christian Patriarchs to President Yasser Arafat, Prime Minister Ehud 
barak, and Us President bill Clinton, 17 July 2000 (Letter 2000); statement on Jerusalem 2006.
23 The notion of division was officially sanctioned in statement on Jerusalem 2006.
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Lack of clear-cut agenda can be partly attributed to differences of various 
patriarchates. It seems to be especially the case when comparing approaches 
of Greek orthodox and Latin Patriarchates. whereas in the perspective of 
the Greek orthodox Patriarchate the role of the church in the Holly Land is 
purely spiritual and, as such, not involved in promotion of political goals,24 
Latin Patriarchate has not hesitated to express sensitive political statements.25 
needless to say, different understanding of the patriarchal role has determined 
views on the legal status of Jerusalem and political concerns of its habitants. 
The position of the Greek orthodox Patriarchate has limited to a promotion of 
its own patriarchal rights and a protection of the freedom of worship with no 
advocacy for political solutions. Latin Patriarchate, by contrast, perceived the 
promotion of the status quo in a wider sense and included protection of the 
cultural and political rights of the Christian communities.26
An additional aspect of the defragmentation refers to a sphere of inner-de-
nomination relationships. These relationships are, to some extent, determined by 
a gap between a performance of churches and expectations of lay communities. 
This phenomenon has developed partly due to the fact that local Christianity has 
been represented at two separate, often not corresponding, levels – an official 
level of the hierarchy and a practical level represented by common people. An 
interesting opinion on this problem has been expressed by rev. J. Khader who 
perceived quietism of Churches as a serious drawback hindering advocacy for 
the social and political rights of the Palestinian communities.27
Part III 
one of the aims of the research was to find out whether position of the patriarchates 
on Jerusalem question was in accordance with a solution to Jerusalem preferred 
by so called common PJCh. To assess the problem I applied a questionnaire which 
24 The Greek Orthodox Church and the Future of Jerusalem, “Palestine-Israel Journal” 17 
(2011) no. 12, p. 230–236.
25 such an approach was particularly relevant to the office of Patriarch Michel sabbah who, 
as a native Palestinian, perceived his position through the lens of political commitment. During 
his office Latin Patriarchate issued few politically important statements e.g. Jerusalem First – A 
Message by Michel Sabbah, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, 29 september 1996. 
26 Urgent Appeal by the Commission for Justice and Peace of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem 
for Assistance and Action to the bishops of the world, 10 october 1996; Chancellor of the Latin 
Patriarchate of Jerusalem, statement on the Church’s Position on the Final status of Jerusalem, 
Jerusalem August 2000. For study on M. sabbah writings see: Ch. H. Miller, Jerusalem the Holy 
City in Selected Documents of the Holy See and in Writings of Michel Sabbah, Latin Patriarch 
of Jerusalem, [in:] Christianity and Jerusalem: Studies in Modern Theology and Politics in the 
Holy Land, ed. A. o’Mahony, Leominister 2010.
27 Author’s interview with J. Khader, 10.11.2013. The interview was made as a one of the 16 
in-depth research interviews. similar opinions were expressed by the other informants. 
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included series of open and closed questions. The most relevant questions that 
address the problem discussed in the paper are presented below28.
The status question (question no. 1, tables no. 2 and 3) was formulated as 
follows: ‘which option do you prefer as a solution to Jerusalem’. The aim of 
the question was to explore whether there was a preferred alternative to Israeli 
de facto sovereignty. In that sense the question regarded not only a favoured 
solution but also respondents’ perspective on the current Israeli ethnocratic 
political framework.
The respondents were asked to choose from following options
A. Jerusalem must be united and undivided under full sovereignty of Israel 
as well as recognized as its capital.
b. Jerusalem must be united and undivided under full sovereignty of Palestine 
as well as recognized as its capital.
C. Jerusalem must be united and undivided but neighbourhoods inhabited 
by Palestinians must be recognized as the capital of Palestine and neigh-
bourhoods inhabited by Jews must be recognized as the capital of Israel.
D. Jerusalem must be united and undivided under sovereignty of international 
authority consisting of representatives of Israel, independent Palestine, 
United nations as well as representatives of Islam, Judaism and Christianity.
E. Jerusalem must be divided as it was before June 1967 so the eastern part 
would become the capital of an independent Palestine and the western 
part would become the capital of Israel.
F. There is no reason to change the current situation.
G. other.
Each respondent was additionally ask to justify its answer. This procedure 
allowed me to ascertain the motifs behind respondents’ choices. The reasons 
were consecutively grouped in general categories and subcategories.
Question no. 1 – preferred solution to Jerusalem
Table no. 1 – preferred solution to Jerusalem
Preferred solution number of choices %
A. solution no. 4, independent Jerusalem 84 42,4%
b. solution no. 1, Israeli Jerusalem 34 17,2%
C. solution no. 5, divided Jerusalem  30 15,2%
D. solution no. 2, Palestinian Jerusalem 16 8,1%
E. solution no. 3, shared Jerusalem  13 6,6%
28 The results of the status question as well as a description of a procedure applied to obtain 
the answers will be included in a paper that is being prepared as an outcome on Diyar Conference: 
shifting Identities: „Changes in the social, Political, and religious structures in the Arab world” 
that was held in Paphos, Cyprus (3-5 of July 2015).
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F. solution no. 6, status quo 13 6,6%
G. solution no. 7, other 8 4%
H. Total 198
The results indicated strong support for an idea of the city without distinct 
national or political boundaries. This tendency can be additionally exemplified by:
A. strong support for the idea of Jerusalem independency
b. 92 respondents (solution no. 4. and no. 7 – 46,4%) have chosen inde-
pendent Jerusalem regime,
C. 148 respondents (74,7%) haven’t chosen Israeli regime,
D. 136 respondents (68,7%) haven’t chosen Palestinian regime.
E. Moderate support for exclusive (Palestinian or Israeli) control
F. 46 (solution no. 2 and 5 – 23,2%) have been in favour of Palestinian 
regime,
G. 36 (solution no. 1 and partly no. 6 – 18,1%) have been in favour of 
Israeli regime.
secondly, respondents were clearly in favour of an inclusive vision of 
Jerusalem, that is a vision involving cooperation and coexistence with Muslims 
and Jews – 97 respondents (49%) have chosen solution no. 4. and solution no. 3.
An analysis of the qualitative component (table no. 2) of the question 
indicated that status preferences were attributed to such needs as: an equal 
socio-political status for all religions; Christian rights protection; protection of 
Jerusalem universal heritage; social safety; stability and security. In this sense, 
the respondents have chosen inclusive solution to Jerusalem as most coherent 
with their collective needs.
Table no. 2 – reasons for the most popular status solution given by the respondents
solution no. 4, independent Jerusalem
reason number of answers
A. equality of rights for all religions 26
b. Christian rights protection  14
C. peace, safety, cooperation  12
D. universality of Jerusalem heritage 6
E. protection from Israel or/and Jews 6
F. protection of holly cites 5
G. third party involvement in a peace process 4
other 8
Total 81
no explanation given 3
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Question no. 2 – opinion on negotiations
The analysis of the question show strong disappointment and lack of trust 
toward negotiation process. 139 respondents (70%) have not labelled negotiation 
process as contributing to PJCh interest. Majority of these respondents who 
have labelled negotiations as partly responding to PJCh needs referred only to 
the religious or cultural aspects. At the same time only 20 respondents (10%) 
responded to the question affirmatively (table no. 3).
In general, 62 respondents felt they had been in some way omitted or ne-
glected due to minority status or that their rights were respected. (points A, C, 
D in ‘yes’ section of the table no. 3). 20 respondents expressed disappointment 
with the performance of Palestinian negotiators.
The feeling of disappointment correlates with the preference toward independent 
Jerusalem. It can be expected that PJCh do not trust Israeli or Palestinian side 
of the conflict. As much they are Palestinians they do not believe in Palestinian 
agenda represented by PLo.
Table no. 3 – the opinion on negotiations
‘no’ answers (139 answers)
reason number of answers
A. we are to small / weak / powerless to be considered by negotiators 25
b. Palestinian negotiators cared more  
about Muslim holy sites / Aqsa mosque 20
C. nobody consider us as having rights / nobody  
respect our rights 20
D. nobody cares what we want 17
E. negotiators cared about land only 11
F. nobody recognized the fact that we live here 7
G. negotiations were designed to reflect interest of Muslims 7
H. we were too week due to internal division, we didn’t have  
a representation / support from patriarchates 7
other 19
no comment 6
Total 139
‘To some extend’ answers (36 answers)
reason number of answers
A. we are able to pray at holy sites, participate  
in Christian events, it allowed institutions to function 9
b. negotiators focused only on holly sites and omitted  
social and political rights 7
C. only officially from the side of PA 4
D. It didn’t secured religious rights 4
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other 10
no comment 2
Total 36
‘Yes’ answers (20 answers)
reason number of answers
A. we remained a part of Palestinian case  7
b. It allowed churches and Christian institutions  
to perform their functions and protected holy sites 3
C. other 6
D. no comment 4
E. Total 20
Question no. 3 – the opinion on Church involvement
The majority ,112 respondents, expected church representatives to be 
involved in the negotiation process (table no. 4). The analysis of the open 
part of the question showed that PJCh perceived the church involvement as 
a tool of defending their collective identity, securing their collective rights and 
preservation the very existence of their community.
Table no. 4 – the opinion on Church involvement
‘Yes’ answers (112)
reason number of answers
A. To fight for Christian rights  41
b. so we can have a Christian voice and Christian view  15
C. To preserve existence of Christians in Jerusalem 13
D. To secure access to the holy sites and right  
to pray / participate in religious events 9
E. To bring peace between religions 6
F. To advocate worldwide about problems of Christians 6
G. To facilitate negotiation efforts 6
other 11
no comment 3
Total: 112
‘no’ answers (74)
reason number of answers
A. religion and politics should be separated 30
b. They should devote themselves to religious duties 12
C. They should focus on social issues 9
D. because it’s a waste of time / nothing will change anyway  
/ nobody will listen 9
other 8
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no comment 6
Total 74
Conclusion 
Patriarchates’ perception on the Jerusalem conflict has undergone important 
changes, especially when it comes to the position toward Israeli policies. The 
dynamics that came with the shift in the understanding of the special status and 
the status quo concepts has become a response to the very particular Israeli 
measures aimed at power monopolisation.
This approach appears to be in accordance with the expectations of so called 
common PJCh who are looking at the status question from the perspective of 
their socio-political vulnerability. Given the persistence of the Israeli ethnocracy 
as well as the negotiation impasse, PJCh are more open to alternatives that 
would secure their collective rights and individual well-being. Even though 
the probability of the solution of independent Jerusalem regime is low the very 
needs that are behind this choice can still be addressed. PJCh are clearly in 
favour of an inclusive vision of Jerusalem which would not only secure their 
rights but also would respect the rights of other ethnicities. such an approach 
can be perceived as being rooted not only in the desire to search for alternatives 
to the Israeli exclusivity but also as emanating from the Christian values.
both contexts, political and axiological, should be in the attention of 
Jerusalem Patriarchates.
At the same time, it seems that PJCh expectations toward the role of church in 
Jerusalem include not only spiritual dimension but also a political one. because 
of the high level of disappointment with hitherto, undertaken peace process, as 
well as, lack of political leadership, it’s safe to argue that the patriarchates can 
play a vital role in political mobilization. Despite the fact that the political agenda 
of the Patriarchates has its limits any attempt to address political preferences of 
PJCh that would respond to their needs in the sphere of collective rights will 
be received with appreciation.
Abstract
The paper discusses a question of Palestinian Jerusalem Christian (PJCh) position on the 
problem of Jerusalem status. It presents a part of findings of a research that was undertaken 
to investigate PJCh preferable solution to Jerusalem problem. The main aim of the paper is to 
discuss similarities and differences of official and common level perspective of the problem. 
The problem has been approached through the analysis of written sources issued by Jerusalem 
patriarchates and analysis of the questionnaire that had been used to investigate common PJCh 
position of Jerusalem status.
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